Tighten auth helper origin checks
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@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ This is a behavior guide for packet semantics beyond raw schemas.
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- accepts browser sockets only when websocket `Origin` matches `CHGRID_HOST_ORIGIN`
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- reads `chgrid_session_token` from websocket `Cookie` header
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- attempts resume before sending `auth_required`
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- exposes `GET /auth/session/clear` to expire the `HttpOnly` cookie (`X-Chgrid-Auth-Client: 1` required)
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- exposes `GET /auth/session/clear` to expire the `HttpOnly` cookie (`X-Chgrid-Auth-Client: 1` and matching `Origin` required)
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- Server applies auth hardening before accepting login/register/resume:
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- login/register PBKDF2 work runs off the event loop in bounded worker concurrency
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- repeated auth failures are rate-limited by IP and IP+identity windows
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