v5.6 batch: signed releases + stronger passwords enforced + relay address-proof

The everyone-must-update release. Four coordinated changes, each from the security
discussion Ed approved 2026-07-27, plus the remembered-apps polish:

1. SIGNED RELEASES. build-release.ps1 now signs the release zip (ECDSA P-256 /
   SHA-256, --sign-update verb) with a private key that lives ONLY at Ed's chosen
   location outside the repo; the matching public key is embedded (UpdateSignature)
   and the updater REFUSES any release whose .sig asset is missing or does not
   verify - a compromised GitHub account can no longer ship code to users. The
   signing verb self-checks against the embedded key so a key/embed mismatch fails
   the pipeline, and the gate proves the on-disk key matches the embed when present.

2. STRONGER PASSWORDS, ENFORCED (BREAKING). PBKDF2 raised 100k -> 600k (both peers
   must derive the same key, so 5.6 cannot stream with pre-5.6 AT ALL - release
   notes lead with it). New PasswordStrength rule (>= 8 chars, not an infamous
   password) enforced at EVERY door: both password dialogs block weak NEW entries
   with concrete plain-English advice; the streaming gate walks an existing weak
   password through strengthening; and ForPlainPassword - the single derivation
   choke-point shared with the service - refuses weak outright, so no path streams
   on a guessable password. Headless service logs the why. Per Ed: painful once,
   and this coordinated-update release is the cheapest moment it will ever have.

3. RELAY ADDRESS-PROOF (watch-only). The relay sends every new client address a
   random cookie and marks it verified when echoed - a forged source address can
   never echo, killing the reflection attack. 5.6 clients echo automatically
   (AddrCheck type 10, verbatim, self-limiting); the relay ships watch-only
   (logs would-blocks) until the fleet updates, then one flag (--require-addr-check)
   enforces. Per-IP entry cap (4) enforced immediately. Relay changes are committed
   but NOT deployed to the Pi - they ride the v5.6 release moment.

4. Remembered-apps empty state teaches its lifecycle + manual sentence; About/
   release notes written; version bumped to 5.6.

New gate steps: signing round-trip/tamper/wrong-key/embed-match; password rules incl.
the exact "Games" case; AddrCheck verbatim echo. Gate 69/69.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ednunp
2026-07-27 08:19:20 +01:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 9574d9d08b
commit 6c53fe54d1
18 changed files with 658 additions and 51 deletions
@@ -78,7 +78,38 @@ internal static class ProfilePasswordManagerDialog
rows.Add((title, current, box));
}
var okButton = new Button { Text = "&OK", AutoSize = true, DialogResult = DialogResult.OK };
var okButton = new Button { Text = "&OK", AutoSize = true };
// OK validates by hand (no auto-close DialogResult): every CHANGED, non-empty entry passes
// the same strength gate as the single-password dialog — one rule at every door. Unchanged
// entries always pass (an old weak password is grandfathered until the day it's changed).
okButton.Click += (_, _) =>
{
foreach (var (title, original, box) in rows)
{
var entered = box.Text.Trim();
if (entered.Length > 0
&& !string.Equals(entered, original, StringComparison.Ordinal)
&& PasswordStrength.Critique(entered) is { } advice)
{
var page = new TaskDialogPage
{
Caption = "Choose a stronger password",
Heading = $"The new password for “{title}” is too easy to guess",
Text = advice,
Icon = TaskDialogIcon.Warning,
Buttons = { TaskDialogButton.OK },
DefaultButton = TaskDialogButton.OK,
AllowCancel = true,
};
TaskDialog.ShowDialog(dialog, page);
box.Focus();
box.SelectAll();
return;
}
}
dialog.DialogResult = DialogResult.OK;
dialog.Close();
};
var cancelButton = new Button { Text = "&Cancel", AutoSize = true, DialogResult = DialogResult.Cancel };
var buttons = new FlowLayoutPanel { Dock = DockStyle.Bottom, FlowDirection = FlowDirection.RightToLeft, AutoSize = true, Padding = new Padding(8) };
buttons.Controls.Add(okButton);